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ABSTRACT
What is the relation between infrequent price adjustment and the dynamic response of the
aggregate price level to monetary shocks? The answer to this question ranges from a one-to-one-
link (Calvo, 1983) to no connection whatsoever (Caplin and Spulber, 1987). The purpose of this
paper is to provide a unified framework to understand the mechanisms behind this wide range of
results. In doing so, we propose new interpretations of key results in this area, which in turn
suggest the kind of Ss model that is likely to generate substantial price rigidity. The first result
we revisit is Caplin and Spulber’s monetary neutrality model.  We show that when price
stickiness is measured in terms of the impulse response function, this result is not a consequence
of aggregation, but is due instead to the absence of price-stickiness at the microeconomic level.
We also show that the “selection effect,” according to which units that adjust their prices are
those that benefit the most, is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the higher aggregate
flexibility of Ss-type models compared to Calvo models. Instead, the key concept is the
contribution of the extensive margin of adjustment to the aggregate price response. The
aggregate price level is more flexible than suggested by the microeconomic frequency of
adjustment if and only if this term is positive.
Keywords: Aggregate price stickiness, adjustment hazard, adjustment frequency, generalized
Ss model, extensive margin, Calvo model, strategic complementarities.
JEL codes: E32, E62.1 Introduction
Understanding the response of the aggregate price level to monetary shocks is among the
central questions in monetary economics. Since the origin of almost any aggregate nominal
rigidity is a microeconomic rigidity, there have been many studies documenting microeco-
nomic pricing behavior, in particular the frequency of microeconomic price adjustment.2
For these studies to be relevant for macroeconomic policy, we need to understand the
mapping from infrequent price adjustment to aggregate price stickiness. We already know
that this mapping can be surprising. Caplin and Spulber (1987), henceforth CS, construct an
insightful example where there is no relation between these two measures. They combine a
one-sided Ss model of microeconomic price adjustment with a speciﬁc form of asynchronous
adjustment of individual prices (the assumption of a uniform cross-section), and obtain
an aggregate price level that responds one-for-one to monetary shocks. Thus there is no
aggregate price stickiness in their model—the impulse response is one upon impact and zero
thereafter—despite the fact that the frequency of microeconomic price adjustments can take
any value.
In a related recent result, Golosov and Lucas (2006) show that the sluggishness of the ag-
gregate price response to monetary shocks is overestimated when approximating a menu-cost
model with a Calvo model, where adjustment is infrequent but uncorrelated with the size of
price imbalances. That is, the frequency of microeconomic price adjustments underestimates
the ﬂexibility of the aggregate price level in Ss models. Similarly, Bils and Klenow (2004)
report that the ﬂexibility of aggregated price series in U.S. retail data is signiﬁcantly higher
than suggested by the frequency of price adjustments observed in microeconomic data: they
estimate a median monthly frequency of price adjustments of 0.21, while one minus the ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation of the aggregate inﬂation series—a natural measure of aggregate price
ﬂexibility which in their Calvo setting should equal the adjustment frequency—is almost
four times as large.
Aside from these illustrative examples, is there anything more general that can be said
about the connection between the frequency of microeconomic adjustment and the degree of
ﬂexibility of the aggregate price level? What are the precise channels through which microe-
conomic inaction and aggregate price stickiness are connected in Ss models? The purpose
of this paper is to answer these questions and, along the way, oﬀer new interpretations for
some old results.
2See Bils and Klenow (2004), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006a) for the U.S., and Dhyne et al. (2006)
and Fabiani et al. (2006) for a summary of the ﬁndings of the impressive set of country studies sponsored
by the ECB’s Inﬂation Persistence Network.
1There are two new interpretations and mechanisms we discuss in this paper that stand
out. First, the main result in CS is that in their context a small monetary expansion has no
eﬀect on aggregate output, despite the fact that at any given instant most microeconomic
units do not adjust their prices. The standard interpretation of this result is that aggregation
erases the impact of microeconomic stickiness. Our ﬁrst point is that this interpretation
depends crucially on the concept of price stickiness being used. If, at the micro level, this
concept is deﬁned in terms of the frequency of price adjustments, then the statement is
correct, since money is neutral at the aggregate level despite the fact that most ﬁrms do not
adjust their prices at the micro level. Yet if we have in mind a more standard deﬁnition of
stickiness, in terms of the impulse response to monetary shocks, then the usual interpretation
of Caplin and Spulber’s money neutrality result changes dramatically, as now it reﬂects the
absence of microeconomic stickiness.
Second, Golosov and Lucas (2006) coined the expression “selection eﬀect” to describe the
feature of Ss type models that adjusting ﬁrms are those that need it most, in sharp contrast
with Calvo’s model, where adjustment is completely random. They argue informally, and
others have followed, that this feature explains the higher aggregate ﬂexibility of Ss type
models over Calvo models, for a given frequency of microeconomic adjustment. We show
that while the selection eﬀect is present in most Ss type models, it is not the key concept
behind their additional ﬂexibility.
Instead, the key concept is that of an extensive margin. That is, of the additional
price increase resulting from the rise in the fraction of agents adjusting upwards and the
fall in the fraction of agents adjusting downwards, both as a consequence of an additional
monetary impulse. It contrasts with the intensive margin, which describes the additional
price increase (or reduced price decrease) of those ﬁrms that were going to adjust anyway.
Only the intensive margin is active in the Calvo model, while in Ss type models both margins
are strictly positive. This extensive margin is a generalization of the eﬀect of the number
of agents reaching the trigger thresholds in Ss models discussed by Bar-Ilan and Blinder
(1992).3
Section 2 revisits the Caplin and Spulber model. Section 3 begins our study of the relation
of aggregate price ﬂexibility and the frequency of microeconomic adjustment, considering a
simple extension of the Caplin and Spulber model that includes the Calvo model as a limiting
case. Sections 4 and 5 are the core of the paper: they describe the key results in the context
3Incidentally, while Golosov and Lucas (2006) used the expression “selection eﬀect” to describe the
mechanism behind their ﬁnding, they do point out in their formal analysis that the key diﬀerence between
the Calvo model and their particular Ss model is the change in the number of agents that adjust in response
to a monetary impulse. The point, however, is that selection and extensive margin are not synonyms.
2of a generalized Ss model, which includes standard Ss models as a particular case. Section
6 concludes and is followed by an appendix.
2 Caplin and Spulber Revisited
This section recreates and clariﬁes the source of the Caplin and Spulber monetary neutrality
result. It also provides a natural starting point for the topics we cover in later sections.
2.1 The Model
Let us focus on the aspects of the model which are relevant to our concerns, skipping the
derivation of the underlying microeconomic rules or a discussion of general equilibrium as-
pects, which are largely orthogonal to the issues we address (see, e.g., Stokey (2002) and
Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) for useful references on the steps we skip).
There exists a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Let pit and p∗
it denote the (log of
the – henceforth omitted) actual and target price, respectively, both for ﬁrm i at time t.4 In
CS there are no idiosyncratic shocks and, leaving aside inessential constants:
p
∗
it = mt (1)
where mt denotes the money stock. The sample paths of mt are continuous and increasing.
Aggregate output, yt, is proportional to (the log of) real balances:
yt = mt − pt,




If there are no frictions in microeconomic price adjustment, pit = p∗
it = mt, so that pt = mt
and money is neutral. Suppose instead that there is a ﬁxed cost of adjusting individual prices
and hence ﬁrms adopt Ss rules in setting their prices. As usual, it is convenient to deﬁne a
state variable:
xit ≡ pit − p
∗
it.
4In a model with stochastic adjustment costs, p∗
it is deﬁned formally as the price the agent would choose,
conditional on the current state of the economy, if its current adjustment cost draw is equal to zero.
3The adjustment rule is such that when xit reaches s − S, the ﬁrm increases the price by
S−s. This large adjustment catches up with the accumulated monetary expansion since the
previous adjustment and anticipates some of the expansion that will take place before the
next adjustment (recall that p∗
it is equal to mt plus a constant; furthermore, following the
convention used in generalized Ss models, this constant is chosen so that the price imbalance
x is zero immediately after ﬁrms adjust their prices).
In CS, ﬁrms’ adjustments are not perfectly synchronized because the initial cross-section
distribution of actual prices is non-degenerate. In particular, CS assume that the initial
distribution of x is uniform over the entire (s − S,0] interval. It turns out that under
the monotonicity and continuity assumptions for the sample paths of money, this uniform
distribution is invariant: While the position of individual ﬁrms in state space changes over
time, the cross-section distribution remains unchanged and uniform over (s−S,0]. Figure 1,
taken from CS, illustrates the variation over time of r ≡ x + S, for an agent i; note that
in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, the distance between agents on the circle remains
unchanged.
Figure 1: The Caplin and Spulber Model
2.2 Main Result
The main result in CS is that in this context a small monetary expansion has no eﬀect on
aggregate output, despite the fact that at any given instant most microeconomic units do
not adjust their prices. To see this result, note that a monetary expansion of ∆m triggers
4the adjustment of ∆m/(S − s) ﬁrms, and each of these ﬁrms increases its price by (S − s).




× (S − s) = ∆m (2)
and hence
∆y = 0.
The standard interpretation of this result is that aggregation erases the impact of microeco-
nomic stickiness. Our ﬁrst point is that this interpretation depends crucially on the concept
of price stickiness one has in mind. If this concept is deﬁned in terms of the frequency of
microeconomic price adjustments, then the statement is correct, since money is neutral at
the aggregate level despite the fact that most ﬁrms do not adjust their prices at the micro
level. Yet if one has in mind a more standard deﬁnition of stickiness, in terms of the impulse
response to monetary shocks, then the usual interpretation of Caplin and Spulber’s money
neutrality result changes, as now it reﬂects the absence of microeconomic stickiness.
We support our claim in two steps. Consider ﬁrst the price-response ∆pi(∆m,x) of a
representative ﬁrm i, with state variable x to a small monetary shock of size ∆m. A shift of
x by ∆m leads to no adjustment if the ﬁrm is at a distance larger than ∆m from the trigger







0, if x > s − S + ∆m,
S − s, otherwise,







0, if x > s − S + ∆m,
(S − s)/∆m, otherwise.
To obtain a measure of microeconomic ﬂexibility in terms of the impulse response func-
tion, we average this expression over all possible values of x. The obvious candidate to weigh
the diﬀerent values of x is the average time-distribution (ergodic distribution) of the state
5Strictly speaking, the adjustment is from x − ∆m to 0, but s − S − x + ∆m is suﬃciently small for
adjusting ﬁrms that s − S is a good approximation and simpliﬁes the expressions. Of course, the limit as
∆m → 0 does not depend on this approximation.









It is intuitively obvious (for a proof see Section 3) that a ﬁrm’s ergodic density in CS is
uniform on (s − S,0], so that hE(x) is constant and equal to 1/(S − s).
The impulse response of Ss (and Calvo) type models typically decreases monotonically
and adds up to one because of long run neutrality. Thus, much of the persistence of the
IRF to monetary shocks is summarized by the initial response to such a shock. We therefore

















In other words, if we follow a ﬁrm over time and draw the histogram of its marginal
responses to a monetary shock, ∆pit/∆m, most of the observations pile up at zero. Yet
a small fraction of observations pile up at (S − s)/∆m, corresponding to times where the








converges to one as T tends to inﬁnity.
Property 1 (The IRF in Caplin-Spulber has no microeconomic price-stickiness)
In Caplin and Spulber: FCS,micro = 1.
It is easy to extend the above result to the complete impulse response function, beyond
its ﬁrst element. Denote by IRF
micro
k the average price response of a ﬁrm at time k to a small







1, for k = 0,
0, for k ≥ 1.
6Thus, not only Fmicro, but any reasonable deﬁnition of price-ﬂexibility based on the entire
IRF, assigns no microeconomic stickiness in the CS context.
The second step in our study of the IRF in Caplin and Spulber connects microeconomic
and aggregate price stickiness. It follows from our derivation of Caplin and Spulber’s result—
see equation (2)—that the aggregate response of the price level to monetary shocks is also
one-for-one upon impact and zero thereafter. This is the well known CS result. Our point,
however, is that the actual cross-section distribution has little to do with this result. Once
the model has no microeconomic stickiness, the macroeconomic result follows regardless of
what the cross-section distributions look like. We turn to this issue next.
2.3 Relation between Micro and Macro Stickiness
The result that micro and macro stickiness are the same is quite general and follows from
the Ergodic Theorem (see, e.g., Walters (1982). We sketch the proof of this result next.
Given a cross-section f(x) for the state variable, we have that the aggregate price response






To obtain an aggregate measure of price ﬂexibility, we need to average the above expression
over all possible cross-sections f(x): f1(x), f2(x), ..., fn(x).6 The measure of aggregate price






where wk denotes the weight of the k-th cross section, with wk > 0 and
Pn
k=1 wk = 1.
Denoting the weighted average of all cross-sections by fA(x), and noting that the operator
deﬁned in (4) is linear, we have:
F





Of course, no averaging is needed for the CS model, since all cross sections fk(x) in (5) are
the same in this case (and uniform on (s − S,0]). More generally, however, such an average
6The actual number of cross-sections is inﬁnite and not countable, thus measure theory is required for a
formal statement and proof. We assume a ﬁnite number for illustrative purposes.
7exists under rather weak conditions and, by the Ergodic Theorem, is equal to the individual
ﬁrm’s ergodic density, hE(x), considered in (3). Since fA(x) = hE(x), comparing (3) and (6)
yields the following property:
Property 2 (Macro and micro price ﬂexibility are always the same)
Macro– and microeconomic price ﬂexibility, as measured by Fmacro and Fmicro, are the




Furthermore, a straightforward extension of the derivation of this result shows that the macro
and micro impulse response to a monetary shock are the same at all lags. (Where the macro
response is obtained by averaging over all cross sections, and the micro response by averaging
over all individual time-series.)
Our interpretation claim for the CS model now follows from Properties 1 and 2:
Property 3 (The source of aggregate price ﬂexibility in Caplin and Spulber)
When price stickiness is deﬁned in terms of the impulse response function, the source of
aggregate price ﬂexibility in Caplin and Spulber is the absence of stickiness at the microeco-
nomic level.
2.4 The Role of the Cross-Section
It is apparent from the previous property that the uniform cross-section distribution in CS
has nothing to do with the absence of aggregate price stickiness in their model. So what
is the role played by this assumption? The answer is that by choosing a distribution that
does not vary over time, CS ensured that the response of the economy to aggregate shocks
is the same at all moments in time. For most Ss-type models this is not the case, since
the cross-section varies endogenously over time, and so does any reasonable measure of price
ﬂexibility (for example, the one deﬁned in (4)). To illustrate this point, we develop a simple
generalization of CS (see Caballero and Engel (1991) for more details).
Consider the CS setting, except for the initial distribution of ﬁrms’ state variable, which
now covers only half the inaction range: the Ss bands are normalized to S − s = 2 and the
initial distribution is uniform on [−3/2,−1/2].
8Figure 2: p and m in an extension of Caplin-Spulber













p with strat. compl.
The solid line in Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the price level under the additional
assumption that m grows linearly over time at the rate µ. Initially, there is a period where
no ﬁrm adjusts its price and the aggregate price level does not change. Eventually, ﬁrms
reach the trigger level s−S and the aggregate price level rises twice as fast as money. After
the last ﬁrm adjusts, a new period without price adjustment begins, and so on.
We ﬁrst note that the ergodic density for a single ﬁrm continues to be uniform on the
entire inaction range, (−2,0]. Thus our measure of micro price-ﬂexibility, Fmicro, is equal to
one as in the standard version of Caplin and Spulber, which from Property 2 implies that
Fmacro = 1 as well.
Since in this case f varies over time, so does the conditional price-ﬂexibility measure





0 when no ﬁrm is adjusting (f(−2+) = 0),
2 when some ﬁrms are adjusting (f(−2+) = 1).
Thus, what is special about CS within the class of one-sided Ss models is not that there is
no aggregate price stickiness. It follows from the Average Neutrality Result in Caballero and
Engel (1993a) that this is the case for a broad family of models of this type. Instead, what
9is special about CS’s cross-section distribution is that it is invariant and hence the response
of the aggregate price level to monetary shocks does not vary over time.
2.5 Strategic Complementarities




it = (1 − a)mt + apt, (7)
where the parameter a ∈ [0,1/2) captures the extent to which ﬁrms wish to coordinate their
prices. Firms have stronger incentives to keep their prices in line with those of other ﬁrms
when a is larger.
The aggregate change in prices during a small time unit ∆t is given by:
∆p = ∆p
∗f(s − S)∆t × (S − s), (8)
where ∆p∗f(s − S)∆t is the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust and S − s the size of their adjust-
ments. Equation (8) extends (2) to this more general setting.





0 when no ﬁrm is adjusting (f(−2+) = 0),






0 when no ﬁrm is adjusting (f(−2+) = 0),
(2 − 2a)/(1 − 2a) when some ﬁrms are adjusting (f(−2+) = 1).
(9)
The dash-dotted line in Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the price level when a = 0.4.
Compared with the case without strategic complementarities (a = 0, solid line), the aggregate
price level remains constant during longer periods of time. The ﬂip side is that when the
aggregate price level increases, it does so at a faster rate, since a larger fraction of ﬁrms
adjust their price in any given time period. The longer periods of inaction and the shorter
but brisker periods with price adjustments cancel each other out so that the ﬂexibility index
F—which is equal to the average of F(f)—continues to be equal to one.
103 From Caplin-Spulber to Calvo
What relation should we expect between the price adjustment frequency and aggregate price
ﬂexibility in menu-cost models? The one-sided Ss models described earlier, with complete
price ﬂexibility at the aggregate level regardless of the adjustment frequency, suggest that
the answer is none. At the other extreme is the Calvo (1983) model, where both concepts
coincide and aggregate ﬂexibility is equal to the adjustment frequency. More generally,
however, the answer is in between these two extremes.
In the CS model, the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust in one time period, henceforth the











where µ, as before, denotes the money growth rate (assumed constant), (s−S,0] the inaction
range, and we have assumed that the choice of time unit is such that there are always ﬁrms
that do not adjust within a given period (i.e., µ < S − s).




Let us now modify the one-sided Ss model and assume that in addition to the trigger
threshold s − S, there is a strictly positive hazard λ that a ﬁrm adjusts at any point in
time, regardless of its price imbalance x. Thus, we have a model that nests both Calvo and
one-sided Ss models: As s tends to minus inﬁnity we obtain the Calvo model, while if λ = 0
we are back to CS.
If f(x,t) denotes the cross-section density at time t, then
f(x,t + ∆t) = (1 − λ∆t)f(x + µ∆t,t), s − S < x ≤ 0.
This follows from the fact that a ﬁrm with a price imbalance x at time t+∆t must have had
a price imbalance x+µ∆t at time t, and that a fraction λ∆t of ﬁrms with imbalance x+µ∆t
at time t adjusts before reaching x because of a Calvo-type shock. From the derivation of
Property 2 we know that the time-average of all possible cross-sections, fA(x), is equal to
the ergodic distribution of an individual price setter. Let us calculate this average, as it is
the concept we need to compute A and F.
Setting f(·,t + ∆t) = f(·,t) ≡ hE(·) = fA(·) in the expression above, using a ﬁrst-order








, s − S ≤ x ≤ 0. (10)
Choosing the unit with which we measure time small enough so that the probability of
two Poisson-shocks for the same ﬁrm in a given time-period is negligible, we have that the
fraction of ﬁrms that adjust in one time period is:
Fraction of adjusters = λ + (1 − λ)FA(s − S + µ) (11)
where FA denotes the c.d.f. for fA. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the fraction of
ﬁrms that adjust because of a Poisson shock. The second term considers, among those that
did not receive such a shock, the fraction that adjusted because their state variable reached
the trigger s − S. It follows that:
Fraction of adjusters ∼ = λ + (1 − λ)fA(s − S)µ, (12)
and from (10) we have that:
A







Hence, since the fraction of agents that adjust before reaching the CS-trigger s − S grows
with λ, the frequency of adjustment index Aλ increases monotonically with λ.
For technical reasons, it is useful to turn to discrete time when calculating the price-




∼ = λ + (1 − λ)fA(s − S)(S − s). (14)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the marginal price increase due to the monetary
shock, for those ﬁrms with a Poisson-induced adjustment. The marginal response of these
ﬁrms to the monetary shock is one-for-one. The second term is the additional contribution
to inﬂation from ﬁrms that adjust because they reach the trigger barrier s − S. In contrast
with the Poisson-induced adjusters, the response of these ﬁrms is (S − s)/∆m times the
12shock that triggers their adjustment, and therefore much larger than one-to-one, so that









Also note that Fλ does not vary monotonically with λ. It is one for λ = 0 (the CS
case) and again one for λ = 1 (no micro frictions). It is decreasing for small values of λ and
increasing for larger values (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: F and A for a Caplin-Spulber model with Poisson Shocks
















This simple example illustrates the complex connection between aggregate ﬂexibility and
the price adjustment frequency. Whether an increase in the frequency of price adjustments
reduces price stickiness depends on how the increase in frequency aﬀects the contribution of
the intensive and extensive margins to the ﬂexibility index F.
The intensive margin refers to ﬁrms for which the monetary shock only aﬀects ﬁrms
behavior by increasing the price adjustment of those that would have adjusted anyway, with
or without the monetary shock. These are the ﬁrms for which the Poisson shock triggers
their adjustment, their contribution to F is the ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of (15). The extensive
margin, by contrast, refers to ﬁrms whose adjustment is triggered by the marginal monetary
shock (the impulse), their contribution to F is the second term on the r.h.s. of (15).
The contribution to F of the intensive margin increases with λ, this is obvious. What is
13less obvious is that the contribution of the extensive margin decreases, since the fraction of
ﬁrms in the neighborhood of the trigger barrier s − S, f(s − S), decreases. While the rate
at which the intensive margin component of F increases with λ is constant (and equal to
one), the rate at which the extensive component decreases is large (in absolute value) for
small values of λ and small for larger values of λ. The reason for the latter is that the rate
at which the fraction of ﬁrms in the neighborhood of the adjustment trigger s−S decreases
becomes smaller and smaller as λ grows.
Taking stock, once we incorporate Poisson shocks into the CS environment, we have
that, as expected, the ﬂexibility and frequency of price adjustment indices move in the same
direction for large values of λ: more ﬁrms adjusting means that the aggregate price level is
more responsive to shocks. Yet, as shown in Figure 3, which plots Fλ and Aλ as a function of
λ for a given (s−S,0] interval, for small values of λ both indices move in opposite directions.
The reason is that for small values of λ the weakening of the extensive margin mechanism
dominates over the standard positive relation between adjustment frequency and ﬂexibility,
explaining why Fλ decreases as λ increases.
This example also helps motivate a point we develop in a more general context in the
following section: The frequency of adjustment index is a lower bound for ﬂexibility in Ss
models, and this lower bound is achieved by the Calvo model. To see this, compare (13)
and (15), and recall that our choice of time period ensures that µ < (S −s) (also recall that




The Calvo model is obtained by taking the limit as s goes to minus inﬁnity, in which case






4 The Extensive Margin Eﬀect
Let us generalize the model of the previous sections to consider a broader set of shocks and
adjustment rules. These extensions are more easily implemented in discrete time. Shocks
to the growth rate of money are i.i.d. with mean µ and variance σ2
A, and ﬁrms experience
idiosyncratic (productivity and demand) shocks vit which are i.i.d. with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2
I. No assumptions are made regarding the common distribution across aggregate (and
idiosyncratic) shocks. These shocks are independent across agents and from the aggregate
14shock. With these assumptions, the target price follows the process:
∆p
∗
it = ∆mt + vit.
With no further changes, and preserving the ﬁxed cost of adjusting prices at the mi-
croeconomic level, this environment yields a two-sided Ss policy (see, e.g., Barro (1972)).
We generalize it further and assume that there are i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks to adjustment
costs as well, drawn from a distribution G(ω). Integrating over all possible realizations of
these adjustment costs, we obtain an adjustment hazard, Λ(x), deﬁned as the probability of
adjusting prior to knowing the current adjustment cost draw, with7
0 ≤ Λ(x) ≤ 1, ∀x.
It follows that for non-degenerate distributions G(ω), Λ(x) is decreasing for x < 0 and
increasing for x > 0: the cost of deviating from the target price is increasing with respect to
the distance from this price and therefore adjustment is more likely when |x| is larger. This
is the increasing hazard property (Caballero and Engel, 1993c).
Denoting by f(x,t) the cross section of price imbalances immediately before adjustments




4.1 A Basic Inequality
Let ∆p0(∆md) denote the average (over all possible cross-section distributions) inﬂation
response to a monetary deviation of ∆md from its average growth rate. The ﬁrst element of





7See Caballero and Engel (1999) for a detailed discussion of such a model, Dotsey, King and Wolman
(1999) for an application to prices in a dynamic general equilibrium context, and Caballero and Engel (1993b)



















Note that the ﬁrst term on the right hand side corresponds to the adjustment frequency,
A. The second term, which we denote by E, corresponds the contribution of the extensive
margin (more on this shortly). Thus we can write:
F = A + E. (18)
It follows that:
Property 4 (Flexibility and adjustment frequency are the same in the Calvo model)
In the Calvo model, where Λ0(x) = 0, we have that E = 0 and FCalvo = ACalvo.
More importantly, it also follows that:
Property 5 (The adjustment frequency is a lower bound for ﬂexibility)
In increasing hazard models we have E > 0, and therefore F > A.
Proof The increasing hazard property states that Λ0(x) > 0 for x < 0 and Λ0(x) < 0
for x > 0. It follows that xΛ0(x) > 0 for all x, and therefore E =
R
xΛ0(x)f(x)dx > 0 and
F > A.8
The above results can be extended to the case with strategic complementarities along
the lines of what we did in Section 2.5 (see Caballero and Engel, 2006). When the strategic
complementarity parameter a in (7) is positive, (18) becomes:
F ∼ = h(A + E),
8This result also holds if we work with the weaker concept of “increasing hazard property”, according to
which Λ(x) satisﬁes this property if Λ0(x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ 0 and Λ0(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0, with strict inequality on a
set with positive measure (under the model’s ergodic density).
16where h(x) is a strictly increasing function.9 As before, a positive extensive margin E ac-
counts for a larger average response of the price level to monetary shocks than suggested by
the intensive margin A.
4.2 Extensions
In this subsection we discuss two extensions of the above results. First, we consider the case
of standard Ss policies, where the smoothness assumptions under which we derived (17)
do not hold. Second, we show that the above inequality extends to the case of conditional
impulse responses.
4.2.1 Standard Ss Policies
The above derivation assumes that Λ(x) and fA(x) are continuous, which does not hold for
standard Ss models, such as Barro (1972), Caplin and Spulber (1987), and other models
where the distribution of adjustment costs is a mass point.10 As shown in the Appendix,




















k ) and f(x
−
k ) denote the limit of f(x) when x approaches xk from the right (larger
values than xk) and left, respectively.
In particular, for a standard two-sided Ss policy, where ﬁrms’ remain inactive when their
price imbalance belongs to [L,U], we have that the ﬁrst, second and third terms on the right
hand side of (19) are equal to FA(L)+(1−FA(U)), 0 and |L|fA(L)+UfA(U), respectively,
so that:11
F = FA(L) + (1 − FA(U)) + |L|fA(L) + UfA(U), (20)
where FA denotes the c.d.f. corresponding to fA.
It follows that for a standard two-sided Ss model we have:
A = FA(L) + (1 − FA(U)),
E = |L|fA(L) + UfA(U).
9h(x) = (1 − a)x/(1 − ax).
10See Sheshinski and Weiss (1993) for a comprehensive volume on Ss models of pricing decisions.
11Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1992) derive a similar expression in the context of one-sided Ss rules.
174.2.2 Conditional Impulse Responses
As we showed in Section 2, time variation in the cross-section distribution leads to price-
ﬂexibility indices that vary over time. In generalized Ss models, the cross section distribution
of price imbalances is inﬂuenced by the sequence of monetary shocks hitting the economy. To
quantify the extent to which the IRF ﬂuctuates over time, we note that the expressions we
derived above also apply to time-varying measures of price-adjustments and price-ﬂexibility.
Denote by f(x,t) the cross-section of price imbalances at time t, by At the fraction of
ﬁrms adjusting their price in period t and by Ft the ﬁrst element of period t’s impulse
response function. We then have that:






That is, ﬂuctuations in the IRF of generalized Ss models are driven by changes in the
fraction of agents that adjust in any given time interval and in the extensive margin.
5 Extensive Margin or Selection Eﬀect?
As mentioned earlier, the term E quantiﬁes the importance of the extensive margin eﬀect.
That is, of the additional price increase resulting from the rise in the fraction of agents
adjusting upwards and the fall in the fraction of agents adjusting downwards, both as a
consequence of the additional monetary impulse. It contrasts with the intensive margin A,
which describes the additional price increase (or reduced price decrease) resulting from the
larger adjustment (after the monetary impulse) of those that were going to adjust anyway.
In the Calvo model, only the intensive margin is active, while in increasing hazard models
both margins are strictly positive.
This extensive margin is a generalization of the eﬀect of the number of agents reaching the
trigger thresholds in Ss models discussed by Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1992).12 More recently,
Golosov and Lucas (2006) have referred to the additional ﬂexibility in Ss models as the
selection eﬀect, arguing that the agents that adjust their prices in response to a monetary
shock are those that beneﬁt the most from doing so. As we show below, the selection eﬀect
is not always an accurate description of the source of the additional ﬂexibility present in Ss-
12For recent papers highlighting the role of the extensive margin see, for example, Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2005) and Burstein and Hellwig (2006).
18type models. For this reason, we instead advocate using the extensive margin index deﬁned
above to characterize the additional responsiveness to monetary shocks in Ss-type models.
In order to understand the mechanisms at work, we consider a ﬁrm with price imbalance
x and decompose its marginal response to a monetary shock, F(x), into the sum of the




where η(x) ≡ xΛ0(x)/Λ(x) denotes the elasticity of the adjustment hazard with respect to
the price imbalance x.
An increasing hazard model is characterized by η(x) ≥ 0, yet, as we show next, this does
not always imply that F(x) ≡ A(x) + E(x) increases monotonically with |x| (which is what
a selection eﬀect means).
5.1 First Example
Assume Λ(x) belongs to the inverted normal family:13
Λ(x) = 1 − e
−λ2x2
, (21)
with λ2 > 0.
Figure 4 plots the intensive, extensive and total response as a function of the price
imbalance x. As is the case with all increasing hazard models, A(x) is increasing in |x|.
Some simple algebra shows that, for all λ2 > 0, E(x) is increasing in |x| for values of x
such that λ2x2 < 1, that is, values of x with Λ(x) < 1 − 1/e ∼ = 0.632. For larger values of
|x|, however, the extensive margin eﬀect decreases as the magnitude of the price imbalance
increases. It is therefore not surprising that in the range of price imbalances with suﬃciently
high probability of adjusting (Λ(x) > 1 − e−3/2 ∼ = 0.78), F(x) decreases monotonically with
|x|.14
For this family of adjustment hazards, the largest marginal price response to a monetary
shock comes from ﬁrms with an ex-ante probability of adjusting slightly below 80%. Firms
with higher adjustment probabilities beneﬁt more from changing their price but contribute
less to the economy’s marginal response to a monetary shock. It follows that the “selection
13See Caballero and Engel (1999) for an application of this family to investment.
14Both statements above follow from A(x) = 1 − e−λ2x
2
, E(x) = 2λ2x2e−λ2x
2
, A0(x) = 2λ2xe−λ2x
2
,
E0(x) = 4λ2x(1 − λ2x2)e−λ2x
2
and F0(x) = λ2x(6 − 4λ2x2)e−λ2x
2
.
19Figure 4: Generalized Ss Model where the Selection Eﬀect does not hold











eﬀect” does not provide the correct intuition underlying the larger price response to monetary
shocks in this example.
5.2 General Insight
The insight of the preceding example is valid more broadly. In generalized Ss models, Λ(x)
attains its minimum value at x = 0. Furthermore, often this minimum value is zero and
Λ(x) admits a quadratic approximation 1









2Λ00(0)x2 = 2. (22)
We also have that, in general, Λ(x) approaches one as |x| grows, so that Λ0(x), and therefore
η(x), approach zero. It follows that, as |x| increases, η(x) must decrease from a value of 2 at
x = 0 to values close to 0 when |x| is large enough.15 Thus, two eﬀects pull F(x) in opposite
directions as |x| increases. First, ﬁrms tolerate less well larger price imbalance and are more
likely to adjust their price, that is, A(x) is increasing in |x|. If this were the only eﬀect
present, the selection eﬀect would always hold. Yet there is a second eﬀect: as |x| grows
15Furthermore, in Caballero and Engel (2006) we show that if η(x) remains close to 2 in a suﬃciently large
neighborhood of x = 0, we have E ∼ = 2A and therefore F ∼ = 3A.
20large enough, the elasticity η(x) eventually is decreasing in |x|. This leads to a diminishing
contribution of the extensive margin, Λ(x)η(x), and points in the opposite direction. The
selection eﬀect provides the correct intuition only when the former eﬀect dominates for all
values of x. However the latter eﬀect is likely to dominate for large enough |x| in many
Ss-type models, since E(x) is decreasing in this range of values while A(x) approaches a
constant value of one.
Property 6 (The Selection Eﬀect and the Extensive Margin Eﬀect)
In generalized Ss models, the ﬁrms that contribute the most to the aggregate price level
are not necessarily those that beneﬁt the most from adjusting. This is due to the fact that
the contribution of the extensive margin decreases with the size of the price imbalance when
the latter is suﬃciently large.
The above property also holds for standard Ss models in discrete time. Consider a





      
      
1, x ≤ L,
1 + |x|/∆m, L < x ≤ L + ∆m,
0, L + ∆m < x < U,
1 + x/∆m, U < x < U + ∆m,
1, x ≥ U + ∆m.
(23)
Firms with imbalances slightly above the trigger L and slightly below the trigger U are the
ones that contribute most to the aggregate price level’s marginal response to a monetary
shock. The former, because the shock leads them to adjust their price upward when they
would have remained inactive in the absence of the monetary shock. The latter, because
the additional monetary expansion modiﬁes their optimal choice from adjusting their price
downward to not adjusting at all. In contrast, ﬁrms with larger imbalances (x << L or
x >> U) beneﬁt more from adjusting but contribute less to the aggregate price response.
5.3 Second Example
In our ﬁrst example the selection eﬀect does not hold and yet E > 0. Next we provide an
example where the selection eﬀect is present and E = 0.
Aggregate shocks are drawn from a density with zero mean and bounded support, with a
very small variance. Idiosyncratic shocks are drawn from the trimodal distribution depicted
21Figure 5: Density of idiosyncratic shocks













in Figure 5.16 With a high probability (0.8 in the ﬁgure), the idiosyncratic shock is zero while
with a low probability (0.2 in the ﬁgure) it is the realization of one of two densities with
bounded support that is far away from zero. These two densities only diﬀer in their means,
which have the same magnitude but opposite signs. It follows that idiosyncratic shocks are
either large and positive, large and negative, or zero.
The cost of adjusting prices is a ﬁxed fraction of ﬁrms proﬁts, leading to a two sided
Ss policy as in Barro (1972). The resulting ergodic density is shown in the solid line in
Figure 6, which also shows the corresponding Ss bands (dashed line). As can be seen in
this ﬁgure, there are no ﬁrms at the trigger barriers, so that E = 0 and F = A in this
case. The leptokurtic shape of idiosyncratic shocks implies that very few ﬁrms—in this
simple and extreme example no ﬁrm at all—have their price imbalance in the region where
marginal monetary shocks aﬀect their decision to adjust. Firms either have large (absolute)
price imbalances and adjust independent of the additional monetary shock, or have small
deviations and will not adjust, with or without the marginal shock. Yet the selection eﬀect is
present since those ﬁrms that adjust are, indeed, those with largest imbalances and therefore
those who most beneﬁt from doing so, even though their marginal contribution to the price
level is the same as that of adjusting ﬁrms in a Calvo model.
16This results in a leptokurtic distribution for idiosyncratic shocks, as in Midrigan (2006) and Gertler and
Leahy (2006).
22Figure 6: Ergodic density and Ss bands













In summary, what matters for the additional ﬂexibility of increasing hazard (and standard
Ss) models is the increase in the fraction of agents adjusting in the direction of the impulse
(and the decrease of agents adjusting in the opposite direction), caused by the impulse.
Whether these changes in the decision to adjust come from agents that are near the tails or
the target is a secondary factor.
Decomposing the ﬂexibility index F into the sum of the contribution of the intensive
and extensive margins, A and E, provides a simple way of quantifying the additional price
responsiveness present in Ss-type models. The larger is E, the larger is the contribution to
the aggregate price level of time-variations in the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting.
We have provided an example where there is no selection eﬀect and E > 0, and another
example where the selection eﬀect holds, yet E = 0. We conclude that selection is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient to obtain an aggregate price level that, for a given frequency of price
adjustments, responds more to monetary shocks than the corresponding Calvo model.
6 Final Remarks
The recent work of Golosov and Lucas (2006), Burstein (2006), Klenow and Krystow (2005),
Midrigan (2006), Gertler and Leahy (2006), and others has rekindled the interest in menu
cost type models. As with many microeconomic variables, the prices of goods and services are
seldom adjusted continuously. However, the implications of microeconomic inaction for the
23stickiness of the aggregate price level is only gradually being understood, usually restricted
to important but speciﬁc examples. In this article we have tried to take a step further in
describing the conceptual issues involved in the connection between the frequency of price
adjustments and aggregate price ﬂexibility in generalized Ss models.
The contributions of this paper are pedagogical in nature. In particular, we clariﬁed
the source of the Caplin and Spulber (1987) neutrality result, which does not rely on the
aggregation process but on the particulars of microeconomic adjustment in that model. We
also showed that the reason for the additional ﬂexibility of Ss over Calvo type models comes
from an extensive margin eﬀect. This eﬀect is distinct from the so-called “selection eﬀect,”
which is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the additional ﬂexibility.
The models we analyzed were intended to isolate a particular feature of discrete adjust-
ment, not to oﬀer an account of observed price stickiness. For that, the mechanisms we
discussed need to be interacted with a variety of other sources of stickiness (Ball and Romer,
1990). On this account, the recent work by, e.g., Carvalho (2007), Gorodichenko (2006),
Nakamura and Steinsson (2006b), Dotsey and King (2005) and Kleshchelski and Vincent
(2007) seem particularly promising.
Moreover, in the main text we focused on increasing hazard models, but the results we
derived also provide a hint on what kind of models are likely to generate substantial price
rigidity: These are models with a negative extensive margin eﬀect. Kehoe and Midrigan
(2007) provide one such example, where the option to implement temporary sales eﬀectively
generates a decreasing hazard model for small deviations x. This feature is quantitatively
important since the cross section distribution accumulates a large number of agents for small
values of x, thus it is perfectly possible to generate an E < 0. The important message from
our perspective, however, is that one can still understand the workings of their model with
our framework.
Finally, it should be apparent that there is nothing speciﬁc to prices in our results. These
are properties about contexts where lumpy microeconomic adjustment is prevalent, of which
prices is just one application. At the microeconomic level, investment decisions, durable
purchases, hiring and ﬁring decisions, inventory accumulation, and many other important
economic variables are lumpy in nature and hence ﬁt the essentials of the model in this
paper.17
17For a recent application to investment see, e.g., Bachmann et al 2006. There we argue that in the US F
is signiﬁcantly less than one and time varying, with a substantial rise during the late 1990s.
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26Appendix: Formal Proofs
Proposition A1 (The Case with Discontinuities) Denote by Λ(x) the adjustment haz-
ard, f(x) the cross-section of price imbalances, F the ﬂexibility index and A the fraction of













k ) and f(x
−
k ) denote the limit of f(x) when x approaches xk from the right (larger













Proof The expression for A is straightforward. To derive the expression for F, denote
Ai = (xi−1,xi), i = 1,2...,n + 1; with x0 ≡ −∞ and xn+1 ≡ ∞. Denoting by ∆p0(v) the
change in the price level due to a monetary shock v we have:
∆p0(v) = −
Z





(x − v)Λ(x − v)f(x)dx. (24)
















Applying this result to calculate the n + 1 integrals in the sum on the r.h.s. of (24),






















Since we assumed limx→±∞ xΛ(x)f(x) = 0, the ﬁrst sum on the r.h.s. of (25) is equal to
the sum of the jumps of xΛ(x)f(x). The expression for F now follows.









negative when xk < 0 and positive when xk > 0, as is the case for most Ss-type models, then
F ≥ A.
Corollary A2 (Caplin and Spulber) To obtain a discrete-time approximation to the Caplin
and Spulber model, we consider f(x) uniform on (s − S − µ,−µ], since the relevant cross-
section is the one after the aggregate shock (of size µ), immediately before adjustments take
place. We also assume Λ(x) = 0 if x ∈ (s − S,0) and Λ(x) = 1 otherwise. Proposition A 1
then implies that:
F




Of course, a uniform distribution on the inaction range is only an approximation to the
ergodic density in discrete time. This explains why we obtain even more ﬂexibility than in
the continuous time case.
If we adapt (15) to discrete time, we have:
F
λ = λ + (1 − λ)
α(S − s + µ)
eα(S−s) − 1
,
and we obtain (26) letting λ → 0.
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